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This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage 
contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In 
the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods 
are strategic substitutes, which provides a powerful rationale for staggering. We show that for 
realistic parameter values, there is a continuum of possible equilibria with various degrees of 
staggering of long contracts. If the contracting cost is not too large, then the lowest possible 
degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost and increases with monetary 
uncertainty. 
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Wage contracts are almost uniformly staggered in some countries, but markedly nonuni-
formly staggered in others. This may have important policy implications since the staggering
pattern of wage contracts play a central role in many macroeconomic models. In particular,
monetary policy shocks may lead to diﬀerent output responses depending on the proportion
of wage contracts that are reset at the same time as the shock. Usually, however, there is
no modelling of the economic forces that determine the staggering pattern which is taken
as exogenous. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a theoretical analysis of the
staggering pattern of wage contracts, and to determine how the pattern is inﬂuenced by the
contracting cost, monetary uncertainty, and various other variables.1
Our model assumes that ﬁrms and workers may conclude either short contracts (covering
one period) or long contracts (covering two periods), and that the economy is exposed to
both monetary policy shocks and productivity shocks. Furthermore, the ﬁrms produce
a homogenous output that is sold in a competitive product market, all ﬁrms are equally
productive, and the monetary authority follows a passive monetary policy.2
In our framework there is strategic substitutability between short and long contracts, as
well as between long contracts that are concluded in diﬀerent periods, and this aﬀects the
1 For empirical evidence about the staggering pattern of contracts, see Matsukawa (1986), Fethke and
Policano (1990), and Olivei and Tenreyro (2007, 2008). For theoretical models that show that a staggered
wage setting (in contrast to a staggered price setting) is a powerful mechanism for creating a critical nominal
friction, see Andersen (1998), Huang and Liu (2002), and Christiano et al. (2005). The distinction between
uniform and nonuniform staggering patterns is emphasized in Olivei and Tenreyro (2007, 2008). See also
Clarida et al. (1999), Ascari (2000), Erceg et al. (2000), and Smets and Wouters (2007).
2 We make these assumptions to preclude that staggering of wage contracts could be caused by mo-
nopolistic competition, informational asymmetries, idiosyncratic shocks, or systematic interventions by the
monetary authority. The competitive product market entails that there is no strategic complementarity
in price setting behavior and hence no persistent real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. Presumably, the
introduction of monopolistic competition with the ensuing strategic complementarity in price setting would
mitigate, albeit not eliminate, the strategic substitutability between wage contracts that generates the re-
sults in this paper. Fethke and Policano (1990) show that if there are both competitive and monopolistically
competitive sectors, then informational asymmetries together with a real balance eﬀect may lead to a nonuni-
form contracting pattern, while Matsukawa (1986) and Fethke and Policano (1987) show that an activist
monetary authority may support a nonuniform contracting pattern. See also Fethke and Policano (1986)
and Ball (1987).
1choice of contract duration and provides a powerful rationale for staggering. To explain what
causes strategic substitutability, we note that given its own real wage rate, any ﬁrm beneﬁts
from the other ﬁrms paying higher real wage rates as this increases the equilibrium price of
output. If ﬁrms with continuing wage contracts pay a real wage that exceeds (is less than)
the real wage rate paid by ﬁrms with new wage contracts, then the wage index increases
(decreases) with the proportion of ﬁrms with continuing wage contracts. Furthermore, the
larger the proportion of these ﬁrms, the less (more) their real proﬁt increases (decreases)
relative to the real proﬁts of the ﬁrms with a new wage contracts. As a consequence, an
increase in the proportion of ﬁrms with existing contracts leads to a decrease in the expected
real proﬁt from an existing contract relative to the expected real proﬁt from a new contract.
The upshot is that contracts of diﬀerent lengths, as well as contracts of the same length that
are concluded in diﬀerent periods, are strategic substitutes.
We ﬁnd that for calibrated parameter values, all contracts are long and there is a contin-
uum of possible equilibria with diﬀerent degrees of staggering. If the contracting cost is not
too large, there exists a positive lowest degree of staggering such that there is an equilibrium
for any contracting pattern with at least this degree of staggering (and hence with uniformly
staggered contracts), but not for any contracting pattern with less staggering (and hence
ruling out completely synchronized contracts). For a large value of the contracting cost,
the staggering pattern may be very nonuniform, and there is a continuum of equilibria with
the contracts being anything from uniformly staggered to completely synchronized. Thus,
the model can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts found in some
countries as well as for the notably nonuniform staggering found in others. We also show
that for less realistic parameter values all contracts may be short (in which case the question
of staggering is moot), or short and long contracts may coexist (in which case the latter are
uniformly staggered).
The comparative-static analysis shows that if all contracts are long and the lowest possible
degree of staggering is positive, then that lowest degree of staggering decreases with the
contracting cost and increases with the variance of the monetary policy shocks. Thus,
2the impact of a higher contracting cost and of a higher variance of the monetary policy
shocks are in opposite directions. The intuition for this is as follows: On the one hand,
a higher contracting cost reduces the attractiveness of concluding short rather than long
contracts, and thereby also of deviating from a given pattern of staggered long contracts by
concluding a short contract. On the other hand, increased monetary uncertainty has a more
negative impact in the second period of a long contract than in a short contract covering the
same period. Therefore, it increases the attractiveness of concluding short rather than long
contracts, and thereby also of deviating from a given pattern of staggered long contracts.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with a unit continuum of ﬁrms that produce a homogeneous output
which is sold in a competitive market. The ﬁrms are labelled by i ∈ [0,1]. The production
function of the ith ﬁrm in period t is yit = at￿x
it, where yit is the ﬁrm’s output, at is the level
of aggregate productivity, ￿it is the ﬁrm’s labor input, and x ∈ (0,1). Since ￿it = (yit/at)1/x








where pt is the nominal price of output and wit is the nominal wage rate paid by the ith










































3is an index of the wage rates in the economy.
The aggregate demand in period t equals the money supply, Mt. In order for the real




























Then, by dividing the nominal proﬁt in eq. (1) by pt and substituting pt and yit, we obtain









The future money supply and aggregate productivity are uncertain since both are exposed
to shocks between periods. Thus, the money supply changes according to Mt/Mt−1 =
(1+µ)(1+γt), where µ is the constant trend in the money supply and γt is the monetary policy
shock between period t − 1 and period t. The monetary policy shocks are non-degenerate
i.i.d. random variables with zero mean. The aggregate productivity changes according to
at/at−1 = (1 + ξ)(1 + αt), where ξ is the constant trend in aggregate productivity and αt is
the productivity shock between period t−1 and period t. The productivity shocks are i.i.d.
random variables with zero mean.
Each ﬁrm concludes consecutive wage contracts with its workers, such that when one
contract expires, the next is concluded. A wage contract may cover one period, which is
called a short contract, or it may cover two periods, which is called a long contract.3 We
3 A contract cannot cover more than two periods since the cumulative eﬀect of shocks might then make
it worthwhile for either the ﬁrm or the workers to renege on the contract.
4assume that the ﬁrm’s and the workers’ bargaining powers are such that the wage rate in a
short contract as well as in the ﬁrst period of a long contract will equal a proportion κ of
the aggregate demand in the bargaining period (i.e., for a contract negotiated in period t
the wage rate will be κMt), and that the wage rate in the second period of a long contract
will equal the same proportion κ of the expected aggregate demand in that period (i.e.,
for a long contract negotiated in period t − 1 the wage rate in the second period will be
κEt−1Mt = κMt/(1 + γt)).4
The wage index in period t depends on how many contracts are concluded in period t
and how many were concluded in period t − 1. Let nt denote the proportion of ﬁrms that
conclude long contracts in period t. Then nt ∈ [0,1−nt−1], and 1−nt−nt−1 is the proportion
of ﬁrms that conclude short contracts in period t. Since the wage rate in period t equals
κMt for the 1 − nt−1 ﬁrms that conclude contracts in period t and equals κMt/(1 + γt) for
the nt−1 ﬁrms that concluded long contracts in period t−1, we obtain from eq. (3) that the










= κMt(1 − nt−1 + nt−1Bt)
(x−1)/x. (5)
Here, Bt ≡ (1+γt)x/(1−x) is the ratio of the output of a ﬁrm that is in the second period of a
long contract concluded in period t−1 to the output of a ﬁrm that concludes a new contract
in period t. Thus, if nt−1 = 0 and all the ﬁrms conclude new contracts in period t, the index
in period t is κMt. Conversely, if nt−1 = 1 and none of the ﬁrms conclude new contracts in
period t, the index in period t is κMt/(1 + γt). More generally, since Bt increases with the
monetary policy shock, unless all the contracts are concluded in period t, for a given money
supply in period t the eﬀect of the second-period wage rates in the long contracts will cause
4 Since Et−1Mt = (1 + µ)Mt−1, if µ = 0, then the wage rate is the same in the two contract periods as
in Taylor (1980). More generally, the wage rate in the second period of a long contract might be a diﬀerent
proportion of the expected aggregate demand in that period. The proportion could depend on x and the
monetary uncertainty, as long as it approaches κ if the monetary uncertainty tends to zero (otherwise output
could ﬂuctuate in the absence of shocks).
5the wage index in period t to decrease with the monetary policy shock between periods t−1
and t.
Now, let us suppose that the ith ﬁrm concludes a short contract in period t. By sub-
stituting wit = κMt and Wt from eq. (5) in eq. (4), we obtain that its real proﬁt from
production in period t is
atxx(1 − x)








(1 − n + nBt)x.
Thus, the real proﬁt from production in period t is proportional to at and fully incorporates
the productivity shock between period t−1 and period t. The factor Ant−1,t, which depends
on nt−1, embodies the eﬀect of the monetary policy shock between period t − 1 and period
t on the real proﬁt from production in period t.
Suppose that, instead, the ith ﬁrm concludes a long contract in period t. Its real proﬁt
from production in the ﬁrst period of the contract would be the same as the real proﬁt in
a short contract. To determine the real proﬁt from production in the second period of the
contract, we ﬁrst advance the period index from t to t + 1 in eq. (4) and in eq. (5) to show









while the wage index in period t + 1 is
Wt+1 = κMt+1(1 − nt + ntBt+1)
(x−1)/x.
We then substitute wi,t+1 = κMt+1/(1+γt+1), and Wt+1 in expression (6) to obtain that the
real proﬁt from production in the second period of the contract concluded in period t is
at+1Bt+1xx(1 − x)
(1 − nt + ntBt+1)xκx
6= at+1kAnt,t+1Bt+1.
At each t in which a ﬁrm negotiates a new contract, it chooses whether the contract
should be short (i.e., cover only t) or long (i.e., cover both t and t+1). In order to negotiate
a contract, the ﬁrm incurs a real contracting cost that is proportional to the real proﬁt in the
contracting period in the absence of a monetary policy shock. That is, the real contracting







, where λt = 1 if a new contract is negotiated in period t, and
λt = 0 if a long contract was negotiated in period t − 1.










(1 + ρ)τ−t ,
where ρ is the discount rate, and the expectation at t is taken over the distribution of all
future real proﬁts. It is assumed that ρ > ξ in order for the discounted expected real proﬁts
to be bounded. The ﬁrm’s discounted expected real proﬁts depend on the ﬁrm’s and all
the other ﬁrms’ choices of contracts in the present and future, and each ﬁrm’s contracting
strategy maps all available information to a choice of either a short or a long contract at
each t that a new contract is negotiated. We consider only Markov contracting strategies,
that is, strategies for which a ﬁrm’s current choice between concluding a short or a long
contract depends on only the available information that directly aﬀects the ﬁrm’s current or
future real proﬁts.
Deﬁnition. The economy is in a Markov perfect contracting equilibrium if in
each period that a ﬁrm negotiates a new contract, the ﬁrm’s Markov contracting
strategy maximizes its discounted expected real proﬁts given that all other ﬁrms
follow their Markov contracting strategies.
3 Contract Characteristics
Firms that always conclude short contracts are called short-contract ﬁrms, and ﬁrms that
always conclude long contracts are called long-contract ﬁrms. The latter are subdivided into
7even ﬁrms that always conclude long contracts in even-numbered periods, and odd ﬁrms
that always conclude long contracts in odd-numbered periods.
We now proceed to establish Lemma 1 which derives the expressions for short- and long-
contract ﬁrms’ discounted expected real proﬁts; Lemma 2 which uses these expressions to
determine the short- and long-contract ﬁrms’ gains from a one-time deviation; and Lemma
3 which implies strategic substitutability between short and long contracts as well as strate-
gic substitutability between long contracts concluded in even-numbered periods and long
contracts concluded in odd-numbered periods.5
3.1 The Discounted Expected Real Proﬁts for Short- and Long-
Contract Firms
Let Te denote an arbitrary even-numbered period and To an arbitrary odd-numbered period.
Deﬁne δ ≡ (1+ρ)/(1+ξ)−1, which is positive. We now determine the discounted expected
real proﬁts for a short-contract ﬁrm, an even ﬁrm, and an odd ﬁrm:
Lemma 1. Assume that there are ne ∈ [0,1] even ﬁrms, no ∈ [0,1 − ne] odd
ﬁrms, and that the remaining ﬁrms are short-contract ﬁrms. The discounted






























5 The proofs of Lemmas 1-3 are in Appendix A.








To understand Lemma 1, assume that aTek = 1. Consider ﬁrst expression (7) for a
short-contract ﬁrm’s discounted expected real proﬁts. The ﬁrst term in the brackets of
expression (7) is the real proﬁt from production in period Te. To explain the next term in
the brackets, we note that δ may be interpreted as the discount rate modiﬁed for the eﬀect
of the anticipated changes in the aggregate productivity on expected future real proﬁts,
and that random changes in the aggregate productivity have no eﬀect on expected future
real proﬁts. Thus, the discounted expected real proﬁt from production in any future even-
numbered period equals Et−1Ano,t, which is what the expected real proﬁt from production
would be in any such future period if it were known that the aggregate productivity would
remain unchanged, discounted te − Te periods with the modiﬁed discount rate δ. Similarly,
the discounted expected real proﬁt from production in any future odd-numbered period
equals Et−1Ane,t, which is what the expected real proﬁt from production would be in any
future odd-numbered period if it were known that the aggregate productivity would remain
unchanged, discounted to − To periods with the modiﬁed discount rate δ. Accordingly,
the second term in the brackets of expression (7) is the sum of the expected real proﬁts
from production in all future even- and odd-numbered periods if it were known that the
aggregate productivity would remain unchanged, discounted the relevant number of periods
with the modiﬁed discount rate. That is, the second term consists of Et−1Ano,t multiplied by
1/(1+δ)2+1/(1+δ)4+... = 1/[δ(2+δ)] plus Et−1Ane,t multiplied by 1/(1+δ)+1/(1+δ)3+... =
(1+δ)/[δ(2+δ)]. The third term in the brackets of expression (7) stems from the discounted
expected real cost of contracting in each period.
Consider next expression (8) for an even ﬁrm’s discounted expected real proﬁts. Since
the real proﬁt from production in the ﬁrst period of any long contract is the same as in
a short contract, the real proﬁt from production in period Te and the discounted expected
9real proﬁts from production in all future even-numbered periods are the same as with short
contracts. However, the real proﬁt from production in the second period of a long contract
is generally diﬀerent from what it would be in a short contract, and the discounted expected
real proﬁt from production in an odd-numbered period to (which is the second period of a
contract) equals Et−1 (Ane,tBt), discounted to − Te periods with the modiﬁed discount rate
δ. Hence, the discounted expected real proﬁts from production in all odd-numbered periods
are (1 + δ)Et−1 (Ane,tBt)/[δ(2 + δ)] rather than (1 + δ)Et−1Ane,t/[δ(2 + δ)] as they would
be in the case of short contracts. Finally, the sum of the discounted expected real cost of
contracting is less for a long-contract ﬁrm than for a short-contract ﬁrm. Expressions (9)
and (10) for the discounted expected real proﬁts at To for a short-contract ﬁrm and for an
odd ﬁrm have a similar interpretation.
3.2 The Gain from a One-Time Deviation
We proceed to determine the gain to a deviating short-contract ﬁrm, by which we mean a
short-contract ﬁrm that makes a one-time deviation by concluding a long contract and then
reverts to always concluding short contracts. We also determine the gain to a deviating
even (odd) ﬁrm, by which we mean an even (odd) ﬁrm that makes a one-time deviation by
concluding a short contract in an even-numbered (odd-numbered) period and then reverts
to always concluding long contracts. Let
D(n) ≡ E
t−1













Lemma 2. Assume that there are ne ∈ [0,1] even ﬁrms, no ∈ [0,1−ne] odd ﬁrms,
and that the remaining ﬁrms are short-contract ﬁrms. The gain of discounted
expected real proﬁts at Te for a deviating short-contract ﬁrm is aTekD(ne)/(1+δ),
10and for a deviating even ﬁrm is aTehG(ne,no). The gain of discounted expected
real proﬁts at To for a deviating short-contract ﬁrm is aTokD(no)/(1+δ), and for
a deviating odd ﬁrm is aTohG(no,ne).
Lemma 2 can be understood by observing that if a short-contract ﬁrm deviates in period
Te, then it gains the diﬀerence between the discounted expected real proﬁt in the second
period of the long contract concluded in period Te, that is, aTekEt−1(Ane,tBt)/(1 + δ), and
what the discounted expected real proﬁt would be in a short contract concluded in period
Te + 1, that is, aTek (Et−1Ane,t − c)/(1 + δ). By subtracting the latter from the former, one
obtains that the gain from deviating is aTekD(ne)/(1 + δ).
Similarly, if an even ﬁrm deviates in period Te, then each of the ﬁrst (second) periods
of the long contracts that the ﬁrm will conclude at future odd-numbered (even-numbered)
periods corresponds to a second (ﬁrst) period of one of the long contracts that it would
have concluded at even-numbered periods if it had not deviated. Hence, the gain of dis-
counted expected real proﬁt from deviating in period Te stemming from the odd-numbered
periods Te + 1,Te + 3,... is −aTehD(ne), while the gain of discounted expected real proﬁt
from deviating in period Te stemming from the even-numbered periods Te + 2,Te + 4,...
is aTehD(no)/(1 + δ). Adding the gains stemming from all the odd- and even-numbered
periods, the even ﬁrm’s total gain from deviating is aTehG(ne,no).
The interpretations of the gains for a short-contract ﬁrm and for an odd ﬁrm from
deviating in period To are similar.
3.3 Strategic Substitutability between Contracts
We now establish the fundamental monotonicity property of the D(n) function which un-
derlies the strategic substitutability between short and long contracts as well as between
long contracts concluded in even-numbered periods and long contracts concluded in odd-
numbered periods:
Lemma 3. dD(n)/dn < 0.
11If ne ∈ [0,1] of ﬁrms are even, no ∈ [0,1 − ne] of ﬁrms are odd, and the remaining ﬁrms
always conclude short contracts, then subtracting (7) from (8) shows that the diﬀerence
between the discounted expected real proﬁts at Te for an even ﬁrm and for a short-contract
ﬁrm is aTehD(ne). Similarly, the diﬀerence between the discounted expected real proﬁts at
To for an odd ﬁrm and for a short-contract ﬁrm is aTohD(no). Lemma 3 therefore implies
that the value of always concluding long rather than short contracts decreases with the
proportion of long contracts that are concluded in the same periods. Accordingly, long and
short contracts are strategic substitutes.
The explanation for the strategic substitutability between long and short contracts is
that given its own real wage rate, any ﬁrm beneﬁts from a higher wage index as other ﬁrms
paying higher real wages is associated with a higher equilibrium price. Indeed, eq. (4) shows
that given its own real wage rate, the wage index has an equi-proportional eﬀect on each
ﬁrm’s real proﬁt. Now, the wage index in period t increases (decreases) with the proportion
of ﬁrms that concluded long contracts in period t−1 if the wage rate in these ﬁrms exceeds
(is less than) the wage rate in the ﬁrms that conclude new contracts in period t. Hence,
a larger nt−1 leads to a smaller increase (larger decrease) in the real proﬁt in period t of
ﬁrms that are in the second period of a long contract than for ﬁrms that have concluded
a short contract if the wage rate in the ﬁrms that concluded long contracts in period t − 1
exceeds (is less than) the wage rate in the ﬁrms that conclude new contracts in period t.
As a consequence, an increase in nt−1 decreases the expected real proﬁt of ﬁrms that are in
the second period of a long contract relative to the expected real proﬁt of ﬁrms that have
concluded a new contract. That is, dD(n)/dn < 0 so that long and short contracts are
strategic substitutes.
The strategic substitutability between long and short contracts has important implica-
tions for the gains of a deviating short-contract ﬁrm. According to Lemma 2, if the deviation
takes place in an even-numbered period, the gain of discounted expected real proﬁts is pro-
portional to D(ne) and hence decreases with ne, while if the deviation takes place in an
odd-numbered period, the gain of discounted expected real proﬁts is proportional to D(no)
12and hence decreases with no. In particular, if D(1
2) < 0 < D(0), there exists a unique
proportion of long-contract ﬁrms m ∈ (0, 1
2) such that D(m) ￿ 0 as n ￿ m. Hence, a
short-contract ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate in an even-numbered period iﬀ ne < m,
and to deviate in an odd-numbered period iﬀ no < m.
Turning to the case in which there are only long-contract ﬁrms (and hence ne +no = 1),
the diﬀerence between the discounted expected real future proﬁts at Te for an even ﬁrm and
for an odd ﬁrm is aTeh[D(ne) − D(1 − ne)/(1 + δ)]. Now, dD(ne)/dne < 0, which reﬂects
that in any future even-numbered period an increase in ne decreases the expected real proﬁt
of an even ﬁrm (that is in its ﬁrst contract period) relative to the expected real proﬁt of an
odd ﬁrm (that is in its second contract period), and −dD(1 − ne)/dne < 0, which reﬂects
that in any future odd-numbered period an increase in ne decreases the expected future real
proﬁt of an even ﬁrm (that is in its second contract period) relative to the expected real
proﬁt of an odd ﬁrm (that is in its ﬁrst contract period). Lemma 3 therefore also implies
that the value of always concluding long contracts in even-numbered periods rather than in
odd-numbered periods decreases with the proportion of long contracts that are concluded in
the even-numbered periods. Similarly, the value of always concluding long contracts in odd-
numbered periods rather than in even-numbered periods decreases with the proportion of
long contracts that are concluded in the odd-numbered periods. Accordingly, long contracts
concluded in even- and odd-numbered periods are strategic substitutes.
The strategic substitutability between long contracts concluded in diﬀerent periods is
signiﬁcant for the gains of a deviating long-contract ﬁrm. Lemma 2 shows that if there are
only long-contract ﬁrms and the deviation takes place in an even-numbered period, then the
gain of discounted expected real proﬁts is proportional to G(ne,1 − ne) = −D(ne) + D(1 −
ne)/(1 + δ) and hence increases with ne. If the deviation takes place in an odd-numbered
period, then the gain of discounted expected real proﬁts is proportional to G(no,1 − no) =
−D(no)+D(1−no)/(1+δ), and hence increases with no. As a result, if G(1
2, 1
2) ≤ 0 < G(1,0),
there exists a unique proportion of even ﬁrms ˆ m ∈ [1
2,1) such that G(ˆ m,1− ˆ m) ￿ 0 as n ￿ ˆ m.
Hence, a long-contract ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate in an even-numbered period iﬀ
13ne > ˆ m, and to deviate in an odd-numbered period iﬀ no > ˆ m.
4 Markov Perfect Contracting Equilibria















[(1 + δ)A1t(1 − Bt) − A0t(1 − Bt)].
Note that c1 < c2 < c3. The properties of the equilibria depend on the value of c relative to
these threshold values and and are:6
Proposition 1. There exist Markov perfect contracting equilibria in which con-
tracts are either short, even or odd. There are four diﬀerent regimes:
Regime 1: If c ≤ c1, then n1 = 1 and ne = no = 0;
Regime 2: If c1 < c < c2, then n1 = 1 − 2m and ne = no = m;
Regime 3: If c2 ≤ c < c3, then n1 = 0, ne ∈ [1 − ˆ m, ˆ m], and no = 1 − ne;
Regime 4: If c3 ≤ c, then n1 = 0, ne ∈ [0,1], and no = 1 − ne.
We discuss each of these regimes in turn.
Regime 1 assumes that the contracting cost is so small that c ≤ c1. Since this implies that
D(0) ≤ 0, no short-contract ﬁrm can gain by deviating if all the other ﬁrms are short-contract
ﬁrms. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1(a) where the horizontal axis measures ne
from left to right, and no from right to left. The downward-sloping D(ne) curve shows the
6 The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix B.
14gain of a short-contract ﬁrm from deviating in an even-numbered period if aTek/(1+δ) = 1.
This gain is always nonpositive. The D(no) curve is the reﬂection of the D(ne) curve around
ne = 1
2, and it shows the gain of a short-contract ﬁrm from deviating in an odd-numbered
period if aTok/(1+δ) = 1. Consequently, if n1 = 1 and all ﬁrms conclude short contracts, no
ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. The economy is therefore in a Markov perfect contracting
equilibrium, which is illustrated by the thick dots at ne = 0 and no = 0.
Regime 2 assumes a larger contracting cost satisfying c1 < c < c2. Since a value of the
contracting cost in this range implies that D(1
2) < 0 < D(0), a short-contract ﬁrm gains
from deviating if all the other ﬁrms are short-contract ﬁrms, but loses from deviating in
an even-numbered period if half of the ﬁrms are even and loses from deviating in an odd—
numbered period if half of the ﬁrms are odd. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1(b).
The D(ne) curve intersects the horizontal axis at m, where the gain of a short-contract ﬁrm
from deviating in an even-numbered period vanishes. The upward-sloping G(ne,ne) curve is
the gain of an even ﬁrm from deviating in an even-numbered period if aTeh = 1 and no = ne.
Since G(ne,ne) = −δD(ne)/(1 + δ), this curve likewise intersects the horizontal axis at m,
where an even ﬁrm’s gain from deviation also vanishes. If ne < m, there are so few even
ﬁrms that a short-contract ﬁrm would gain and an even ﬁrm would lose by deviating, while
if ne > m, there are so many even ﬁrms that a short-contract ﬁrm would lose and an even
ﬁrm would gain by deviating. The D(no) and G(no,no) curves show the corresponding gains
for a ﬁrm that deviates in an odd-numbered period. It is apparent that if n1 = 1 − 2m
and ne = no = m, then all the ﬁrms — whether they conclude short contracts or conclude
long contracts in even- or odd-numbered periods — obtain the same discounted expected real
proﬁts. No ﬁrm, therefore, has an incentive to deviate, and short- and long-contract ﬁrms
coexist in the Markov perfect contracting equilibrium that is illustrated by the two thick
dots at ne = m and no = m.7 As an equal proportion of the long-contract ﬁrms conclude
contracts in even and odd-numbered periods (ne = no), the long contracts are uniformly
7 If c1 < 0, then Regime 1 is empty and some ﬁrms conclude long contracts even if there is no contracting
cost (c = 0).
15staggered.
Regime 3 assumes a still larger contracting cost satisfying c2 ≤ c < c3. Since such value
of the contracting cost entails that G(1
2, 1
2) ≤ 0 < G(1,0), a long-contract ﬁrm does not
gain from deviating if half the ﬁrms are even or if half the ﬁrms are odd, but gains from
deviating if all the other ﬁrms have concluded long contracts in the previous period. The
equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1(c). The upward-sloping G(ne,1 − ne) curve shows an
even ﬁrm’s gain from deviating in an even-numbered period if aTeh = 1 and no = 1 − ne.
The G(ne,1 − ne) curve intersects the horizontal axis at ˆ m, where an even ﬁrm’s gain from
deviation vanishes. If ne < ˆ m, there are so many odd ﬁrms that an even ﬁrm would lose by
deviating and becoming an odd ﬁrm, while if ne > ˆ m, there are so many even ﬁrms that an
even ﬁrm would gain by deviating and becoming an odd ﬁrm. The G(no,1−no) curve is the
reﬂection of the G(ne,1 − ne) curve around ne = 1
2, and it shows an odd ﬁrm’s gain from
deviating in an odd-numbered period if aToh = 1 and ne = 1−no. This curve intersects the
horizontal axis at no = ˆ m ⇔ ne = 1− ˆ m, where an odd ﬁrm’s gain from deviation vanishes.
If no < ˆ m ⇔ ne > 1 − ˆ m, an odd ﬁrm would lose by deviating and becoming an even ﬁrm,
while if no > ˆ m ⇔ ne < 1 − ˆ m, an odd ﬁrm would gain by deviating and becoming an
even ﬁrm. Accordingly, for n1 = 0 and any ne ∈ [1 − ˆ m, ˆ m] and no = 1 − ne, there are
no short-contract ﬁrms and neither even nor odd ﬁrms have an incentive to deviate. The
economy is therefore in a Markov perfect contracting equilibrium with all contracts being
long. The range of possible equilibria are illustrated by the thick line between ne = 1 − ˆ m
and ne = ˆ m in Figure 1(c). Uniform staggering of the contracts is possible, but is only one
out of a continuum of possible equilibria. All other equilibria involve nonuniform staggering
with diﬀerent proportions of ﬁrms concluding long contracts in even- and odd-numbered
periods (ne,no ￿= 1
2).
Finally, Regime 4 assumes that the contracting cost is so large that c3 ≤ c. Since this
entails that G(1,0) ≤ 0, a long-contract ﬁrm does not gain from deviating even if all the
other ﬁrms are even or if all the other ﬁrms are odd. The equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 1(d). The G(ne,1−ne) curve is never above the horizontal axis, which indicates that
16no long-contract ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate in an even-numbered period. Since the
G(no,1−no) curve is similarly never above the horizontal axis, it follows that for n1 = 0 and
any ne ∈ [0,1] and no = 1−ne, the economy is in a Markov perfect contracting equilibrium.
The possible equilibria are illustrated by the thick line between ne = 0 and ne = 1. All
contracts cover two periods. Uniform staggering as well as complete synchronization where
all ﬁrms conclude their contracts in the same periods (ne = 1 or no = 1 ) are possible, but
are only two out of a continuum of possible equilibria.
To sum up: Starting with a c smaller than c1, the economy will be in Regime 1 in which
there are only short contracts. As c is increased and reaches c1, the economy will move to
Regime 2 in which there are both short and long contracts, and the long-contract ﬁrms are
uniformly staggered. As c is increased further and reaches c2, the economy will move to
Regime 3 in which there are only long contracts and a positive lower bound for the degree of
staggering. Eventually, as c is increased even further and reaches c3, the economy will move
to Regime 4 in which there are only long contracts and any degree of staggering (including
no staggering at all) can be an equilibrium.
5 Comparative Statics
A natural measure of the degree of staggering of long contacts is min{ne,no}/max{ne,no}.
The degree of staggering decreases with the majority proportion of long-contract ﬁrms (i.e.,
with ne if ne > no, and with no if no > ne). It equals one if the contracts are uniformly
staggered (which necessarily happens in Regime 2 and may happen in Regimes 3 and 4), and
equals zero if the contracts are completely synchronized (which may happen only in Regime
4). The lowest degree of staggering that is possible in Regime 3 is given by s ≡ (1 − ˆ m)/ˆ m.
We now determine the comparative-static eﬀects of changes in the parameter values on
m in Regime 2, and on ˆ m and s in Regime 3.8
Proposition 2. dm/dc > 0; dˆ m/dc > 0; ds/dc < 0.
8 The proofs of Propositions 2-6 are in Appendix C.
17In Regime 2, an increase in the contracting cost reduces the attractiveness of the short
contracts for any n, which increases m and thereby the proportion of long-contract ﬁrms.
In Figure 1(b), the D(ne) and D(no) curves shift upward, and the G(ne,ne) and G(no,no)
curves shift downward. A higher contracting cost is therefore associated with a longer average
contract length.
In Regime 3, an increase in the contracting cost makes it less proﬁtable to deviate for
any n, which increases ˆ m and thus widens the equilibrium range of n’s. In Figure 1(c), the
G(ne,1 − ne) and G(no,1 − no) curves shift downward. A higher contracting cost therefore
reduces the lowest degree of staggering that is possible in equilibrium. Observe that it is
the same logic that compels an increase in the contracting cost to increase the proportion
of long-contract ﬁrms in Regime 2 and to decrease the lowest possible degree of staggering
in Regime 3.
Proposition 3. dm/dρ = 0; dˆ m/dρ > 0; ds/dρ < 0.
In order for short and long contracts to coexist in Regime 2, the discounted expected
real proﬁts from any long contract must equal the discounted expected real proﬁts from two
consecutive short contracts that cover the same two periods. Furthermore, since the real
proﬁt in the ﬁrst period of a long contract equals the real proﬁt in the corresponding ﬁrst
short contract, the expected real proﬁt in the second period of a long contract must equal the
expected real proﬁt in the corresponding second short contract. Therefore, in equilibrium
the gain from deviation is zero for both short- and long-contract ﬁrms, independently of the
discount rate. It follows that in Figure 1(b) the point at which the D(ne) and G(ne,ne)
curves intersect the horizontal axis, and analogously the point at which the D(no) and
G(no,no) curves intersect the horizontal axis, are independent of ρ. Hence, discounting has
no bearing on the determination of m.
Turning to Regime 3 in which all ﬁrms conclude long contracts and there is a positive
lower bound for the degree of staggering, observe that D(1 − ˆ m) > 0 and D(ˆ m) > 0 (since
the D(ne) curve is downward sloping). At ne = ˆ m, therefore, a deviating even ﬁrm’s gain of
discounted expected real proﬁts stemming from odd-numbered periods is negative, while its
18gain of discounted expected real proﬁts stemming from even-numbered periods is positive.
In any long contract concluded after the deviation, the ﬁrst contract period is odd-numbered
and the second contract period is even-numbered, so a higher discount rate attaches relatively
more weight to the negative gain of expected real proﬁts stemming from the odd-numbered
periods than to the positive gain of expected real proﬁts stemming from the even-numbered
periods. Accordingly, it becomes less attractive to deviate, which explains why in Figure
1(c) the G(ne,1−ne) and G(no,1−no) curves move down. A higher discount rate therefore
leads to a higher ˆ m and thereby to a lower s.
Proposition 4. dm/dξ = 0; dˆ m/dξ < 0; ds/dξ > 0.
An increase in the productivity trend aﬀects the gain from deviation only because it
decreases the modiﬁed discount rate. If an increase in the productivity trend has an eﬀect,
it will therefore be in the opposite direction of the eﬀect of an increase in the discount rate.
Consequently, the productivity trend will have no eﬀect on m, a negative eﬀect on ˆ m, and
a positive eﬀect on s.
Concerning the threshold values of the contracting cost, we have:
Proposition 5. dc1/dρ = 0; dc2/dρ = 0; dc3/dρ < 0.
An increase in the discount rate does not aﬀect c1 and c2, and hence does not aﬀect the
range of contracting costs for which Regime 1 and Regime 2 occur. The reason is that in
Regime 1 there are only short-contract ﬁrms, and that in Regime 2 short- and long period
ﬁrms have the same expected real proﬁts in each period. However, an increase in the discount
rate reduces c3 since in Regime 3 there are only long-contract ﬁrms and a higher discount
rate makes it less attractive for such ﬁrms to deviate for a given contracting cost. Hence,
the economy will move from Regime 3 to Regime 4 for a smaller value of the contracting
cost.
Proposition 6. dc1/dξ = 0; dc2/dξ = 0; dc3/dξ > 0.
19The productivity trend may aﬀect the threshold values of c only through its negative
eﬀect on the modiﬁed discount rate. Therefore, an increase in the productivity trend has no
eﬀect on c1 and c2 (since these are not aﬀected by the discount rate) and aﬀects c3 positively
(since an increase in the discount rate aﬀects c3 negatively).
Finally, we note that the trend in the money supply and the uncertainty of aggregate
productivity have no eﬀect on the Markov perfect contracting equilibrium, and a fortiori,
on m, ˆ m, and s, as well as on the threshold values of the contracting cost. The former
follows from the fact that the current and future real wages in both short or long contracts
are independent of the trend in the money supply, which hence does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’
gains from deviation. The latter follows from the fact that the real wages in both short
and long contracts are proportional to aggregate productivity. Therefore, the uncertainty
of aggregate productivity (as opposed to the trend in the aggregate productivity and the
realized productivity shocks) does not aﬀect the current real wage or the expected future
real wages in short or long contracts, and hence also does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ discounted
expected real proﬁts and their gains from deviation.
6 Analytical Approximations
For low levels of monetary uncertainty, it is possible to derive simple analytical approxi-
mations for m, ˆ m, and s, which we denote by m∗, ˆ m∗, and s∗. To derive m∗, we expand
D(m) around γt = 0. By ignoring terms with γt of higher order than two and using that
Et−1γt = 0, we can approximate D(m) by
x(2x − 1 − 2mx2)σ2
2(1 − x)2 + c,
where σ2 ≡Et−1γ2
t is the variance of the monetary policy shocks. Setting this expression
equal to zero, we obtain that for low levels of monetary uncertainty, m is approximately
m
∗ =
2x2 − x + 2(1 − x)2c/σ2
2x3 .
20To derive ˆ m∗, we expand G(ˆ m,1 − ˆ m) around γt = 0. By ignoring terms with γt of a
higher order than two and again noting that Et−1γt = 0, we can approximate G(ˆ m,1 − ˆ m)
by
[δx(1 − 2x) − 2x3 + 2ˆ m(2 + δ)x3]σ2









δ(−x + 2c/σ2)(1 − x)2
2(2 + δ)x3 .
Hence, s is approximately
s
∗ =
1 − ˆ m∗
ˆ m∗ .
It is clear from the expressions for m∗, ˆ m∗, and s∗ that c, ρ, and ξ aﬀect the approximate
values of m, ˆ m, and s in the same way as they aﬀect the exact values of these variables. It
is also apparent that the variance of the monetary policy shocks has a negative eﬀect on m∗
and ˆ m∗, and a positive eﬀect on s∗. Thus, we have
Proposition 7. dm∗/dσ2 < 0; dˆ m∗/dσ2 < 0; ds∗/dσ2 > 0.
As expected, an increase in the variance of the monetary policy shocks has the opposite
eﬀects of an increase in the contracting cost. The logic for this is straightforward in that
ﬁrms with long contracts are more exposed to monetary uncertainty than ﬁrms with short
contracts. In Regime 2, therefore, an increase in the monetary uncertainty would give a
long-contract ﬁrm an incentive to deviate if the proportion of long-contract ﬁrms remains
unchanged. Since the gain of a long-contract ﬁrm from deviating decreases with the propor-
tion of long-contract ﬁrms, that proportion — i.e., m∗ — must decrease in order to eliminate
the incentive to deviate.9
9 Hence, the average contract duration increases with the contracting cost and decreases with the variance
of the monetary policy shocks. A similar result has been obtained by Gray (1978) in a macroeconomic setting
that assumes complete synchronization of all contracts, and by Dye (1985), Harris and Holmstrom (1987),
and Danziger (1988) in a partial equilibrium setting. Empirical support can be found in Ehrenberg et al.
(1984), Christoﬁdes (1990), Murphy (1992), Wallace (2001), Rich and Tracy (2004), and Christoﬁdes and
Peng (2006).
21The majority proportion of long-contract ﬁrms are more exposed to monetary uncertainty
than the minority proportion of long-contract ﬁrms. In Regime 3, therefore, an increase in
the monetary uncertainty would give a ﬁrm from the majority proportion of long-contract
ﬁrms an incentive to deviate if the majority proportion remains unchanged. Since the gain
for a deviating ﬁrm from the majority proportion of long-contract ﬁrms decreases with the
size of the majority proportion of these ﬁrms, an increase in monetary uncertainty causes
the majority proportion of long-contract ﬁrms — i.e., ˆ m∗ — to decrease in order to eliminate
the incentive to deviate. Finally, an increase in the majority proportion of long-contract
ﬁrms leads to a decrease in the lowest possible degree of staggering, i.e., in s∗.




3. By expanding c1, c2, and c3 around γt = 0, and again ignoring














x[δ(1 − 2x + 2x2) + 2x2]σ2
2δ(1 − x)2 .
Like the exact threshold values, c∗
1 and c∗
2 are independent of ρ and ξ, while c∗
3 decreases
with ρ and increases with ξ. Furthermore, we have
Proposition 8. dc∗
1/dσ2 > 0 if x > 1
2 ; dc∗
2/dσ2 > 0; dc∗
3/dσ2 > 0.
Thus, all the approximate threshold values of the contracting cost increase with the
variance of the monetary policy shocks.10 This reﬂects the fact that increased riskiness of
monetary shocks makes long-contract ﬁrms more willing to deviate for a given contracting
cost. It follows then that with more monetary uncertainty, the economy will move from one
regime to the next for higher values of the contracting cost.
10 If x < 1
2, then c∗
1 < 0 and Regime 1 cannot exist, while if x = 1
2, then c∗
1 = 0 and Regime 1 can emerge
only if c = 0.
227 Calibration
In order to assess the empirical relevance of the diﬀerent regimes, we calibrate the model
with realistic benchmark values of the parameters. A standard value for x is x = 2
3, which
implies that c∗
1 < 0. Therefore, Regime 1, in which all contracts are short, cannot materialize.
Further, assuming that each period in the model corresponds to a year, we set ρ = 0.03 and
ξ = 0.02. Hence, δ = 0.01, which implies that c∗
2 ￿ 0.333σ2 and c∗
3 ￿ 268σ2. It follows that
Regime 2 will emerge if the contracting cost is less than 0.333σ2 of a ﬁrm’s real proﬁt; Regime
3 will emerge if the contracting cost is at least 0.333σ2 and less than 268σ2 of a ﬁrm’s real
proﬁt, and Regime 4 will emerge if the contracting cost is at least 268σ2 of a ﬁrm’s real proﬁt.
Setting σ2 ∈ [0.0001,0.001], we obtain that c∗
2 is between 0.00333% and 0.0333%, and that
c∗
3 is between 2.68% and 26.8%. Therefore, the empirical value of c∗
2 is very small, while the
empirical value of c∗
3 is large and implies that the contracting cost constitutes a signiﬁcant
proportion of a ﬁrm’s real proﬁt. Consequently, Regime 2, in which there are both short
and long contracts, is probably also not empirically plausible. Thus, it seems likely that
it will be a regime with only long contracts that materializes in equilibrium. Hence, if the
contracting cost is not too large, then both uniform and moderately nonuniform staggering of
long contracts are feasible equilibrium outcomes,11 while if the contracting cost is large, then
long contracts can be notably nonuniformly staggered. Thus, the model is consistent with
the evidence in Olivei and Tenreyro (2007, 2008) that contract renewals are more uniformly
distributed in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom than in the United States and, in
particular, Japan.
8 Conclusion
The model in this paper has endogenized the staggering pattern of wage contracts. The
crucial feature of the model is that short and long contracts as well as long contracts con-
cluded in diﬀerent periods are strategic substitutes, which has important implications for
11 The lowest degree of staggering is approximately (0.501 − 1.87c)/(0.499 + 1.87c).
23the staggering pattern of long contracts. In particular, we show that in the realistic case
where only long contracts exist, uniform staggering is just one out of a continuum of possible
equilibria with diﬀerent degrees of staggering. Furthermore, if the contracting cost is not
too large, then the lowest possible degree of staggering decreases with the contracting cost
and increases with monetary uncertainty.
24Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider ﬁrst a short-contract ﬁrm in period Te. The ﬁrm’s real proﬁt in this period is
aTek (Ano,Te − c), and its discounted expected real proﬁt from a future even-numbered period
te ∈ {Te + 2,Te + 4,...} is
kETe [ate (Ano,te − c)]
(1 + ρ)te−Te . (A1)
Since ate = aTe(1 + ξ)te−Te ￿ te
τ=Te+1(1 + ατ), expression (A1) becomes
aTe(1 + ξ)te−Tek














(1 + ατ)(Ano,te − c)
￿
. (A2)
The independence of the productivity shocks implies that ETe(1+ατ) = 1 for any Te and τ,
while the independence of the monetary policy shocks implies that ETeAno,te is independent
of Te and te. Therefore, ETeAno,te =Et−1Ano,t for any Te, te, and t. Accordingly, (A1) can be
written as
aTek (Et−1Ano,t − c)
(1 + δ)te−Te . (A3)
The discounted expected real proﬁt at Te from a future odd-numbered period to ∈ {Te +
1,Te + 3,...} is
kETe [ato (Ane,to − c)]
(1 + ρ)to−Te . (A4)
Using that ato = aTe(1 + ξ)to−Te ￿ to
τ=Te+1(1 + ατ), that ETe(1 + ατ) = 1 for any Te and τ,
and that ETeAne,to =Et−1Ane,t for any Te, to, and t, expression (A4) becomes
aTe(1 + ξ)to−Tek





(1 + ατ)(Ane,to − c)
￿
=
aTek (Et−1Ane,t − c)
(1 + δ)to−Te . (A5)
A short-contract ﬁrm’s total expected real proﬁts discounted to period Te consists of
aTek (Ano,Te − c) from period Te plus the sum of (A3) for all future even-numbered periods
25and the sum of (A5) for all future odd-numbered periods. Thus they are











aTek (Et−1Ane,t − c)
(1 + δ)to−Te
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Consider next an even ﬁrm in period Te. The ﬁrm’s real proﬁt in this period and its
discounted expected real proﬁt from a future even-numbered period (i.e., in the ﬁrst period
of a future contract) are the same as for a short-contract ﬁrm. Its discounted expected real
proﬁt at Te from a future odd-numbered period (i.e., in the second period of the present
contract or of a future contract) is
kETe (atoAne,toBto)
(1 + ρ)to−Te . (A7)
Since ETeato =ETe
￿
aTe(1 + ξ)to−Te ￿ to
τ=Te+1(1 + ατ)
￿
= aTe(1+ξ)to−Te for any Te and τ, and
ETe (Ane,toBto) =Et−1 (Ane,tBt) for any Te, to, and t, expression (A7) becomes
aTe(1 + ξ)to−Tek









(1 + δ)to−Te .
Consequently, an even ﬁrm’s total expected real proﬁts discounted to period Te is



























We now turn to a short-contract ﬁrm in period To. The ﬁrm’s real proﬁt in this period is
aTok (Ane,To − c), its discounted expected real proﬁt from a future odd-numbered period is
kETo [ato (Ane,to − c)]
(1 + ρ)to−To ,
26and its discounted expected real proﬁt from a future even-numbered period is
ETok (ateAno,te − cate)
(1 + ρ)te−To .
It follows that the short-contract ﬁrm’s total expected real proﬁts discounted to period To
can be obtained from expression (A6) for a short-contract ﬁrm’s total expected real proﬁts












An odd ﬁrm’s total expected real proﬁts discounted to period To can be obtained from
expression (A8) for an even ﬁrm’s total expected real proﬁts discounted to period Te by








Proof of Lemma 2
Consider ﬁrst a short-contract ﬁrm that deviates in period Te by concluding a long con-
tract, and in period Te + 2 reverts to always concluding short contracts. The deviating
short-contract ﬁrm’s real proﬁt in period Te and its discounted expected real proﬁts from
period Te + 2 and later periods do not change. Its gain of discounted expected real proﬁts
is therefore given by the diﬀerence between the discounted expected real proﬁt from the
second period of an even contract concluded in period Te, i.e., aTekEt−1(Ane,tBt)/(1 + δ),
and the discounted expected real proﬁt in a short contract concluded in period Te + 1, i.e.,










Consider next an even ﬁrm that deviates in period Te by concluding a short contract,
and in period Te +1 reverts to always concluding long contracts (that from then on start in
27odd-numbered periods). The deviating even ﬁrm’s real proﬁt in period Te is the same as if
did not deviate, i.e., aTek(Ano,Te − c), and its discounted expected real proﬁts at Te from all
periods after Te is given by the expected value of concluding long contracts at odd-numbered
periods starting in period Te + 1 and discounted one period, i.e., by the expected value at
Te of expression (10) after Te + 1 has been substituted for To and the expression multiplied
by 1/(1 + δ). Hence, a deviating even ﬁrm’s total discounted expected real proﬁts at Te is
aTek (Ano,Te − c)
+
k










Since ETeaTe+1/(1+ρ) = aTe/(1+δ) and ETeAne,Te+1 =Et−1Ane,t, this formula can be written
as
















Subtracting the total discounted expected real proﬁts for a non-deviating even ﬁrm (ex-















Et−1 [Ane,t (1 − Bt)] −










The gain of discounted expected real proﬁts for a short-contract ﬁrm that deviates in
period To by concluding a long contract and in period To + 2 reverts to always concluding
short contracts can be obtained from expression (A9) by substituting To for Te and no for ne.
28This yields aTokD(no)/(1+δ). Similarly, the gain of discounted expected real proﬁts for an
odd ﬁrm that deviates in period To by concluding a short contract and in period To+1 reverts
to always concluding long contracts (that from then on start in even-numbered periods) can
be obtained from expression (A10) by substituting To for Te and interchanging no and ne.
This yields aTohG(no,ne).
Proof of Lemma 3













Proof of Proposition 1
Regime 1: If c ≤ c1, then D(0) ≤ 0 and the candidate strategy for each ﬁrm is to always
conclude short contracts. We need to show that if n1 = 1, then a short-contract ﬁrm cannot
gain from a one-time deviation from the candidate strategy by concluding a long contract
and afterwards always concluding short contracts. According to Lemma 2, if n1 = 1, then
the gain of a short-contract ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate strategy is proportional
to D(0), and hence nonpositive. The candidate strategy is therefore optimal.
Regime 2: If c1 < c < c2, then D(1
2) < 0 < D(0) and the candidate strategy for each
ﬁrm is to always conclude a similar contract whenever the old contract expires. This makes
each ﬁrm either a short-contract ﬁrm, an even ﬁrm, or an odd ﬁrm. We need to show that
if n1 = 1 − 2m and ne = no = m, then a short-contract ﬁrm cannot gain from a one-
time deviation from the candidate strategy by concluding a long contract and afterwards
always concluding short contracts, and, likewise, that a long-contract ﬁrm cannot gain from
deviating from the candidate strategy by concluding a short contract and afterwards always
concluding long contracts. According to Lemma 2, if n1 = 1 − 2m and ne = no = m, then
29the gain for a short-contract ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate strategy is proportional
to D(m), while the gain for a long-contract ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate strategy is
proportional to −D(m). Since D(m) = 0, these gains are zero, and the candidate strategy
is therefore optimal.
Regime 3: If c2 ≤ c < c3, then G(1
2, 1
2) ≤ 0 < G(1,0) and the candidate strategy is to
conclude a long contract whenever the old contract expires, which makes each ﬁrm either
an even or an odd ﬁrm. We need to show that a long-contract ﬁrm cannot gain from a one-
time deviation from the candidate strategy by concluding a short contract and afterwards
always concluding long contracts. According to Lemma 2, if n1 = 0, ne ∈ [1 − ˆ m, ˆ m], and
no = 1 − ne, then the gain for an even ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate strategy in
period Te is aTehG(ne,1−ne), and the gain for an odd ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate
strategy in period To is aTohG(no,1−no). If ne ≤ ˆ m, then G(ne,1−ne) ≤ 0 so that an even
ﬁrm does not gain from deviating, and if no ≤ ˆ m, then G(no,1 − no) ≤ 0 so that an odd
ﬁrm does not gain from deviating. Consequently, if ne ∈ [1− ˆ m, ˆ m], then G(ne,1 −ne) ≤ 0
and G(no,1 − no) ≤ 0 so that no ﬁrm can gain from deviating. The candidate strategy is
therefore optimal.
Regime 4: If c3 ≤ c, then G(1,0) ≤ 0 and the candidate strategy is to conclude a long
contract whenever the old contract expires, which makes each ﬁrm either an even or an odd
ﬁrm. As in Regime 3, we need to show that a long-contract ﬁrm cannot gain from a one-time
deviation from the candidate strategy by concluding a short contract and afterwards always
concluding long contracts. According to Lemma 2, if n1 = 0, ne ∈ [0,1] and no = 1 − ne,
then the gain for an even ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate strategy in period Te is
aTehG(ne,1−ne), and the gain for an odd ﬁrm that deviates from the candidate strategy in
period To is aTohG(no,1 − no). Since G(ne,1 − ne) ≤ 0 for any ne and G(no,1 − no) ≤ 0 for
any no, no ﬁrm can gain from deviating, and the candidate strategy is therefore optimal.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 2







where ∂D(n)/∂n is evaluated at n = m. Since ∂D(n)/∂n < 0, it follows that dm/dc > 0.






(1 + δ)dG(n,1 − n)/dn
,
where dG(n,1 − n)/dn is evaluated at n = ˆ m. Since dG(n,1 − n)/dn > 0, it follows that
dˆ m/dc > 0.





ˆ m2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Clearly, dm/dρ = 0. To determine the eﬀect of ρ on ˆ m, diﬀerentiate G(ˆ m,1 − ˆ m) = 0 with




(1 + ξ)D(1 − ˆ m)
(1 + ρ)2dG(n,1 − n)/dn
,
where dG(n,1−n)/dn is evaluated at n = ˆ m. Since D(1− ˆ m) > 0 and dG(n,1−n)/dn > 0,





ˆ m2 < 0.
31Proof of Proposition 4
Clearly, dm/dξ = 0. To determine the eﬀect of ξ on ˆ m, diﬀerentiate G(ˆ m,1 − ˆ m) = 0 with




D(1 − ˆ m)
(1 + ρ)∂G(n,1 − n)/∂n
,
where ∂G(n,1−n)/∂n is evaluated at n = ˆ m. Since D(1− ˆ m) > 0 and ∂G(n,1−n)/∂n > 0,





ˆ m2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5





(ρ − ξ)2 E
t−1
[(A1t − A0t)(1 − Bt)]
= −
1 + ξ







− 1)(1 − Bt)
￿
,
which is negative since the term in the square bracket is positive for all Bt ￿= 1. Hence,
dc3/dρ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6





(ρ − ξ)2 E
t−1
[(A1t − A0t)(1 − Bt)]
=
1 + ξ







− 1)(1 − Bt)
￿
,
which is positive since the term in the square brackets is positive for all Bt ￿= 1. Hence,
dc3/dξ > 0.
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